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This thesis provides two studies in the relationship between bank capitaliza-
tion and macroeconomic fluctuations. In the first chapter, I study the effect of
bank capital shortfalls on macroeconomic fluctuations through changes in lending
standards. Existing literature has primarily focused on the rise of credit spreads
when banks suffer capital losses. In addition to this standard interest rate channel,
this paper innovates by introducing a new credit rejection channel - denying more
loan applications (tightening lending standards) - into a macro model with financial
frictions. The model features an endogenous time-varying risk threshold for credit
rejection, which in turn is linked to banks’ balance sheet conditions. I incorporate
the rejection mechanism into a quantitative general equilibrium model and conduct
a banking crisis experiment. During the crisis, loan rejection rates rise significantly,
and lending rate spreads increase mildly, which are consistent with observations on
the bank loan market during the Great Recession. The simulation results further
show that the model with this new channel generates larger amplification of macroe-
conomic variables, compared to an otherwise identical benchmark model. This result
is driven by a combination of two forces: a decline in loan volume and a shift in the
composition of banks’ lending pool, as banks reallocate funds away from risky firms.
Given that riskier firms tend to have better growth prospects, such reallocation can
have long-lasting scarring effects on the economic recovery.
In the second chapter, we take a normative angle of bank capital analysis.
We develop a quantitative dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to identify
bank capital gaps (deviations of the observed level from the optimum) and to shed
light on regulatory policies regarding capital requirement. We propose a tractable
model that includes firms’ and banks’ choice on joint capital structure, and their
endogenous default caused by idiosyncratic and aggregate risk. The model is es-
timated using Bayesian methods with quarterly data on US macroeconomic and
financial variables spanning from 1991Q1 to 2016Q4. Our counterfactual analysis
shows that the impulse responses in the optimal economy exhibit smaller magnitude
compared to that in the calibrated economy. We further decompose the historical
fluctuations in bank capital gaps into contributions from a series of financial shocks,
in addition to the standard macroeconomic shocks. We find that the aggregate risk
shock plays an important role in explaining the spike in capital gaps during the
2007-09 financial crisis. Capital gaps lead to (i) excessive increases in banks’ default
risk and cost of funding, (ii) gaps in lending, investment, employment and output.
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Chapter 1: Bank Capitalization, Lending Standards, and Macroeco-
nomic Dynamics
1.1 Introduction
The last global financial crisis confirmed the vital role of bank capital buffers
for financial stability. Losses in the banking sector caused large contractions in the
supply of credit to the corporate sector.1 In the United States, business lending
of all commercial banks declined by about 34% from the last quarter of 2008 to
the third quarter of 2010.2 Concurrent with the collapse of bank lending, however,
interest rate spreads on bank loans remained almost flat during the same period.3
This poses a challenge for existing models of the transmission channels of bank
losses on credit supply, which largely focus on price channels, and suggests that
other channels may also be important in accounting for the fluctuations in bank
lending. Indeed, banks tightened their lending standards significantly, and rejected
1See, e.g., Ivashina and Scharfstein [2010], Adrian et al. [2013], Chodorow-Reich [2014].
2This fact is calculated using data on all commercial and industry loans, all commercial banks
from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System’s E.2 release.
3For example, the spread between the effective loan rate on C&I loans and the 3-Month Treasury
Bill rate was 2.35% on average during the 18-month crisis period with a peak value of 3%, whereas
this spread was on average 2.33% for the 18-month period prior to the crisis with a peak value
of 2.89%. This fact is calculated using data from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System’s E.2 release.
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more loan applicants during the crisis.4 Bentolila et al. [2018] document that banks
mainly responded to balance sheet deterioration by denying more loan applicants,
whereas the interest rate was scarcely used to ration credit demand during that
period.5 Yet relatively little is known regarding the mechanism through which the
health of banks’ balance sheets affects lending standards and in particular banks’
decisions on credit rejection, the outcome of which has implications not only on the
volume but also on the composition of credit.
In this paper, I propose a new transmission channel linking bank capital short-
falls to the supply of credit in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model – the
credit rejection channel. Through the lens of the model, I attempt to address the
following three questions. 1). Why is there credit rejection? In other words, what
motivates banks to reject some borrowers entirely, rather than charging riskier bor-
rowers a higher interest rate? 2). How are banks’ decisions on credit rejection
affected by the health of their balance sheets? 3). What are the implications of this
mechanism for the allocation of credit, and more importantly, for macroeconomic
outcomes?
Credit rejection, or equivalently credit rationing, is a special phenomenon that
has attracted much attention in the literature.6 Although there have been a num-
ber of theories offering rationales for this phenomenon, these theories are either in
a stylized or static setting, which makes it difficult to draw quantitative implica-
tions, or lack a meaningful capital structure of banks, which makes it difficult to
4See Appendix A.
5Similar findings are documented in Rodano et al. [2018] for the Italian banking sector.
6For example, see Jaffee and Russell [1976], Stiglitz and Weiss [1981], Bester [1985], and
Williamson [1987].
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address questions related to bank health. This paper tackles both challenges. I first
develop a micro-founded theory in which credit rejection is an equilibrium outcome
in the loan market. To this end, the model generates an endogenous cut-off lending
rule, in which banks set a maximum acceptable level of borrowers’ risk and deny
applications for borrowers with risk levels higher than this threshold. The key to
this result is the modeling of firms’ endogenous default as a function of banks’ lend-
ing rate, which implies a risk/return trade-off for banks in adjusting lending rates
and breaks the monotonic relationship between lending rates and banks’ revenue.
I further incorporate this mechanism into a tractable quantitative general equilib-
rium framework. Through the modeling of banks’ endogenous default, I establish
a link between conditions on banks’ balance sheets and banks’ decisions on credit
rejection.
The first contribution of this paper is the modeling of credit rejection. The
credit market setting in this paper follows Bernanke et al. [1999] (henceforth, BGG),
in which a financial contract is specified between borrowers (entrepreneurs) and
lenders (banks). I add additional features to the BGG by allowing entrepreneurs
to be heterogeneous in terms of their ex-ante risk. In this environment, I analyze
how borrowers’ risk affects banks’ profit from lending. The first result is that a
bank’s expected revenue is an inverse U-shaped function of the lending rate. This is
due to the risk/return tradeoff faced by the bank in charging a higher lending rate:
higher lending rates increase the loan repayment from borrowers who do not default;
however, they also increase the fraction of borrowers that default and consequently
3
the associated loss from default.7 This concave relationship implies that there exists
a cap on banks’ expected revenue for any given loan – the bank can never earn more
than that cap. Moreover, I show that this maximum expected revenue monotonically
decreases with borrowers’ risk. The intuition is straightforward. Suppose borrowers’
risk increases in a mean-preserving manner. The increase in right-tail risk does not
benefit the bank, as the loan repayment is predetermined. Yet the increase in left-
tail risk hurts the bank because it increases the borrower’s probability of default and
hence lowers the bank’s expected return. For this reason, if the borrower is too risky,
the bank’s maximum expected value can fall below the bank’s cost of funds. This
is when the bank starts to reject borrowers. The threshold value on the borrower’s
risk is interpreted as the bank’s lending standard.
Another novel feature of this paper is the presence of equilibrium default of
both firms and banks in a joint framework, where both defaults are caused by
fundamental productivity shocks to firms.8 In the model, firms’ return is subject
to an idiosyncratic productivity shock and an aggregate productivity shock. The
default of firms can be attributed to either shock, or a combination of both. In
contrast, while banks are able to diversify idiosyncratic shocks through lending to
a large number of firms, there is no way for banks to diversify the aggregate shock,
7In a similar spirit, this inverse U-shaped relationship is also featured in Stiglitz and Weiss
[1981]. Their result is due to adverse selection: borrowers have private information on their
projects. Therefore, when banks post a higher loan rate, they only attract bad borrowers, which
thus lowers the expected return. In contrast, I do not assume ex-ante information asymmetry in
this paper. My result is driven by the default cost implied by the debt contract.
8Methodologically, the modeling of firm default follows Christiano et al. [2014] and henceforth
Bernanke et al. [1999]. While other models also feature equilibrium default of firms and banks (e.g.,
Clerc et al. [2015], Gete [2018]), bank default in these models is triggered by some “profitability”
shock to banks. In contrast, bank default in my model is driven by fundamental productivity
shocks to firms.
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and as a result bad aggregate shocks trigger bank default. I introduce a capital
structure choice in banks’ balance sheets: they borrow from a mutual fund in the
form of debt, and accumulate equity over time. The possibility of default makes
banks’ debt risky and leads to positive interest rate spreads on banks’ debt. It is
precisely this feature of bank default that transmits changes in banks’ balance sheet
conditions to banks’ cost of funds, and therefore to banks’ lending decisions.
I then calibrate the model to the U.S. economy with data on the U.S. banking
sector. I match model objects in the steady state with key credit market indicators in
the data, including the loan rejection rate, firms’ and banks’ probability of default
(PD), the loss given default (LGD) of bank loans, and non-financial firms’ loan
spreads. The model overall provides a good fit to the data. I simulate a crisis episode
triggered by exogenous negative shocks to banks’ capital. A shortfall in banks’
capital increases banks’ leverage and the likelihood of bank default, which leads to a
higher cost of funds for banks. Since banks’ revenue decreases with the average risk
in the pool of borrowers, banks choose to lower the risk threshold to increase their
expected revenue. Consequently, the fraction of rejected borrowers rises and total
credit supply declines. Aggregate investment, employment, and output subsequently
fall.
The model with this new rejection channel (the full model) is compared to an
otherwise identical benchmark model. Interestingly, while the interest rate channel
is still present in the full model, it reveals dampened effects. The impulse responses
of firm credit spreads in the full model show only mild increases following negative
financial shocks, in comparison to the benchmark model. This response of interest
5
rates in the full model is driven by a combination of two forces. On the one hand,
since the rejected borrowers are the riskier ones, an increase in credit rejection lowers
the average risk in the pool of successful applicants, which puts downward pressure
on the credit spread. On the other hand, the pass-through of rising bank funding
costs puts upward pressure on the credit spread. As a result, the interest rate spread
on loans increases, but to a lesser extent than it does in the benchmark model. This
result is consistent with the fact that interest rate spreads were relatively flat during
the recent crisis. More importantly, the simulation results also show that the full
model generates larger amplification and propagation of financial shocks compared
to the benchmark model.
1.2 Related Literature
This paper is related to several strands of literature. Methodologically this pa-
per contributes to the long line of theoretical and quantitative work on the macroe-
conomic effects of financial frictions. Earlier work in this literature has posited
constraints on the balance sheets of non-financial borrowers. Financial frictions
manifest in the form of collateral constraint as in Kiyotaki and Moore [1997], or in
a costly state verification (CSV) problem as in Bernanke et al. [1999], Carlstrom
and Fuerst [1997], and Christiano et al. [2014]. In both setups, adverse shocks to
non-financial firms’ net worth can be amplified by worsening financial conditions
(the financial accelerator). I follow the CSV approach in this paper. This model-
ing approach generates default in equilibrium and hence credit spreads, which are
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absent in collateral constraint models. Since the onset of the Great Recession, a
growing body of research has started to focus on frictions arising from the financial
intermediation sector. Constraints on the balance sheet of financial intermediaries
inhibit the efficient intermediation of funds to the non-financial sector (Gertler and
Kiyotaki [2010], Gertler and Karadi [2011], Gertler and Kiyotaki [2015], Nuño and
Thomas [2017])9. This paper connects these two bodies of research. I add a second
layer on top of Bernanke et al. [1999]. In the model, the CSV friction exists not
only between firms and banks as in Bernanke et al. [1999], but also between banks
and banks’ debtors. This provides a comprehensive framework to analyze the joint
dynamics of borrowers’ (firms) and lenders’ (banks) balance sheets. One strength of
this model is its ability to identify separately banks’ and firms’ default frequencies
and risk premia within a unified framework.
This paper is also related to the literature explaining banks’ countercyclical
lending standards and exploring its macroeconomic implications. Ruckes [2004] at-
tributes variation of lending policies to changes in the credit quality of borrowers
in a model with price competition among lenders. Dell’ariccia and Marquez [2006]
argue that changes in the informational structure of loan markets can lead to fluctu-
ations in lending standards. Later work focuses on business cycle effects of lending
standards in quantitative general equilibrium models (e.g., Figueroa and Leukhina
[2015], Ravn [2016], Hu [2017], Gete [2018]). My main contributions to this litera-
9Another part of this literature stress the nonlinear effects of equity losses for intermediaries
using continuous time models (See, e.g., He and Krishnamurthy [2013] and Brunnermeier and
Sannikov [2014]). In Brunnermeier and Sannikov [2014], adverse shocks to intermediary equity are
amplified through fire sales. In He and Krishnamurthy [2013], amplification operates through a
substitution of equity financing toward debt financing.
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ture are as follows. First, while these papers study how changes in macroeconomic
conditions affect bank lending standards, this paper focuses on bank balance sheet
conditions, which were at the core of the Great Recession. The results of my model
suggest that bank losses can trigger tighter lending standards, even if macroeconomic
conditions remain unchanged. Second, this paper connects bank lending standards
with borrowers’ heterogeneity in risk. This is new to the literature, as previous pa-
pers emphasize firms’ heterogeneity in productivity and size. An exception is Gete
[2018], which studies labor misallocation caused by firms that are denied credit. By
contrast, this paper focuses on a different channel through capital, as in the finan-
cial accelerator mechanism, and we assess the model’s ability to explain observed
fluctuations in investment and other macroeconomic variables.
This paper emphasizes the important role of bank capital in transmitting ad-
verse shocks arising from the financial sector to the rest of the economy. Along the
same line, Iacoviello [2015] estimates that financial shocks originating from banks
accounted for about two-thirds of the decline in output during the Great Reces-
sion. Using a monetary model including a BGG financial accelerator mechanism,
Christiano et al. [2014] find that agency problems associated with financial inter-
mediation have accounted for a substantial portion of business cycle fluctuations in
the US since the 1980s. However, much of the literature has focused on transmis-
sion through price effects (e.g., Ajello and Tanaka [2017], Bigio [2015], Gertler and
Kiyotaki [2015], He and Krishnamurthy [2013], Brunnermeier and Sannikov [2014]).
This paper complements this literature by introducing a non-price mechanism, and
I find that the credit rejection channel is quantitatively important.
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The mechanism of this paper is supported by a number of empirical papers.
Credit rejection is not an unusual phenomenon in credit markets. During the recent
financial crisis, for example, Laufer and Paciorek [2016] document that US mortgage
lenders introduced progressively higher minimum thresholds on FICO credit scores
for approving mortgage loans. Montoriol-Garriga and Wang [2011] use loan-level
data in the US and find that the decline in loan supply during the Great Recession
was concentrated on loans to the riskiest borrowers. Their findings further reveal
that interest rate spreads on small loans declined on average relative to spreads to
large loans, which is consistent with the pattern of differentially more rationing of
credit to small borrowers. Bentolila et al. [2018] identify a significant causal effect
of declines in bank health on employment losses in Spain. They find that interest
rates were scarcely used by weak banks to ration credit. Rather, the acceptance
rate of loan applications declined significantly following the bank crisis, and the
pattern was more pronounced for weak banks than for healthy banks.10 A similar
result is found in Italian credit markets. Rodano et al. [2018] find that most Italian
banks adjusted their lending standards through higher loan rejection rates during
the downturn.
This paper also adds to the effort of building quantitative models of credit
rationing. In a typical market equilibrium, price would equate supply and demand,
and rationing should not exist. Jaffee and Russell [1976] and Stiglitz and Weiss
[1981] show that rationing can happen in the presence of asymmetric information,
10In a related work, Jiménez et al. [2018] finds that firms with lower credit risk have a higher
probability of being granted loan applications, and this pattern is stronger for less capitalized
banks.
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spawning further work on credit rationing based on an information-theoretic ap-
proach (e.g., Bester [1985], Williamson [1987]). In Stiglitz and Weiss [1981], the
rationale for banks to reject some borrowers is negative adverse selection. The key
insight is that a bank’s return does not always monotonically increase with the in-
terest rate – in fact, it is an inverse U-shape. This paper shares this key insight, but
for a different reason. The friction generating my result is costly state verification
due to ex-post information asymmetry. More importantly, we explore the cyclical
properties of credit rationing in a dynamic setting. In my model, credit rationing is
closely linked with conditions of lenders’ balance sheets, which makes our framework
suitable for studying financial crises.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1.3 describes the partial equilib-
rium model in which banks set lending standards. Section 1.4 lays out the general
equilibrium model. The model is taken to the data in Section 1.5. Section 1.6
conducts quantitative analysis, and Section 1.7 concludes.
1.3 Lending Standards in the Partial Equilibrium Model
In this section, I build a theoretical model to explain why credit rejection can
be optimal for banks. I first discuss entrepreneurs’ heterogeneity and financing, and
then analyze the relationship between banks’ expected revenue and borrowers’ risk in
a partial equilibrium setting. The structure of the credit market follows Bernanke
et al. [1999], in which there are a continuum of entrepreneurs (borrowers) and a
representative bank (lender). The partial equilibrium analysis will be extended to
10
a dynamic general equilibrium framework in Section 3.
1.3.1 Firm Heterogeneity in Risk
Entrepreneurs, indexed by j, operate a firm that uses a linear technology
to transform one unit of consumption goods at period t to εj,t+1zt+1R
k
t+1 units of
consumption goods at period t + 1, where εj,t+1 is the idiosyncratic productivity
shock specific to entrepreneur j, zt+1 is the aggregate productivity shock, and R
k
t+1
is the common return of capital, which will be determined in the general equilibrium.
Entrepreneurs are heterogeneous ex-ante. Each entrepreneur’s idiosyncratic
shock εj,t+1 is identically and independently drawn each period from a log-normal
distribution with different mean and variance. Specifically,
εj,t+1 ∼ F (εj,t+1) = ln N (µj,t, σj,t)
We further assume that the parameter µj,t has the following structure: µj,t =





(εj,t+1)dF (εj,t+1;σj,t) = 1
Entrepreneurs’ heterogeneity can be characterized by their differing idiosyncratic
11One extension here is to allow mean and variance to be correlated. For instance, we could
assume that the parameter µj,t has the following structure:
µj,t = γln(σj,t)− σ2j,t/2
so that Et(εj,t+1) = σγj,t, where γ ≥ 0 is a parameter governing the correlation between the mean
and the variance of the idiosyncratic productivity, and they are positively correlated when γ > 0.
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volatility σj,t, which we refer as the risk of the project. σj,t follows a uniform
distribution with c.d.f. H on the support [a, b], i.e., σj,t ∼ Uniform [a, b]. We
assume that σj,t is i.i.d. across entrepreneurs and over time. The aggregate shock
zt+1 is an i.i.d. draw from a log-normal distribution G(zt+1):
zt+1 ∼ G(zt+1) = ln N (−σ2z/2, σz)
where σz > 0 is the variance of the aggregate shock zt+1.
1.3.2 Thresholds of Firm Default
At the end of period t, entrepreneur j has available net worth NEj,t. Let Qtkj,t+1
be entrepreneur j’s capital expenditure at the end of period t, where Qt is the price
of capital and kj,t+1 is the quantity of capital. We will discuss how kj,t+1 and N
E
j,t are
determined in what follows. To finance the difference between capital expenditure
and net worth, the entrepreneur must borrow an amount bj,t, given by
bj,t = Qtkj,t+1 −NEj,t (1.1)
The amount bj,t is borrowed from the bank in the form of debt. Entrepreneur
j promises to repay the bank at the face value Rbt+1bj,t at time t + 1, where R
b
t+1
is the gross interest rate.12 After the realization of idiosyncratic and aggregate
shocks at time t + 1, if the total value of the firm managed by entrepreneur j falls
12For the moment, I simply assume that the interest rate Rbt+1 is the same for all firms at any
loan amount. I will discuss this assumption in detail in the next section.
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≤ Rbtbj,t+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Loan repayment
(1.2)
I use xj,t+1 to denote firm j’s default threshold on total productivity, which is a
product of the idiosyncratic and aggregate shock, given by




For realizations of xj,t+1 above xj,t+1 the borrower pays R
b
t+1bj,t to the bank. For
realizations below xj,t+1, the bank seizes the borrower’s assets after paying a propor-
tional monitoring cost µE. Firms’ default can be attributed to an adverse idiosyn-
cratic shock εj,t+1 to the firm, or an adverse aggregate shock zt+1 affecting all firms,
or a combination of both. The two shocks have the same impact on an individual
firm’s ability to repay its debt, but they have different implications for the bank,
which we will illustrate in the next section. Conditional on the aggregate shock
zt+1, the defaulting firms are those with realized idiosyncratic shocks lower than




I explore the relationship between banks’ revenue and borrowers’ risk. To
fix ideas, suppose that the bank has extended a loan contract {Rbt , bt} to an en-
trepreneur with risk σt at period t. For the moment let us take the loan contract
as given. We will discuss the determination of the loan contract in what follows.
I drop the individual subscript j to focus on the revenue from one particular loan.
Given this loan contract, the bank’s revenue from this contract is min{Rbtbt, (1-
µE)εt+1zt+1R
k
t+1Qtkt+1}, which depends on the realized value of ε and z shocks,
where 0 < µE < 1 is the monitoring cost. The bank’s expected revenue, denoted by
V Bt (σt; C), can be therefore expressed as

















where C denotes the contract and aggregate variables. The first term inside the
parentheses of Equation (1.4) is the expected return when the entrepreneur does
not default and makes full repayment. This happens when the realized value of the
entrepreneur’s idiosyncratic shock is greater than xt+1
zt+1
. The second term denotes the
expected return when the entrepreneur defaults, in which case the bank liquidates
the total value of the firm, subject to the monitoring cost. The idiosyncratic default
threshold co-moves negatively with the realization of the aggregate shock zt+1. The
outside integral is taken over all possible realizations of aggregate shocks.
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Using the definition of the firm default threshold in Equation (1.3), we can ex-
press the bank’s expected revenue as a function of σt, contract variables {xt+1, kt+1}
and aggregate variables {Rkt+1, Qt+1}, shown as follows:
V Bt (σt; C) = SB(xt+1, σt)Rkt+1Qtkt+1 (1.5)









the bank’s expected share of the project. The bank’s expected revenue is affected by
both the firm default threshold xt+1 and the entrepreneur’s risk σt. For a given level
of σt and kt+1, changing the lending rate , and hence the firm’s default threshold,
has two effects on the bank’s expected revenue, and they work in opposite direc-
tions. Figure 1.1 illustrates the effects of changing xt+1 on the payoff to the bank
and entrepreneur. A rise in xt+1 increases the bank’s expected revenue by raising
the gross expected share that the bank receives in the case of non-default, illus-
trated by the shaded area. At the same time, a higher xt+1 (a higher lending rate)
increases entrepreneurs’ probability of default and consequently raises deadweight
loss, which lowers the bank’s expected revenue, illustrated by the dotted area. The
size difference between the shaded area and the dotted area varies with xt+1. When
xt+1 is small, the first positive effect exceeds the second negative effect so that the
bank’s expected revenue is increasing in xt+1. When xt+1 is large, the second effect
starts to dominate, in which case the bank’s expected revenue starts to fall in xt+1.
Our first finding is that banks’ revenue does not monotonically increase with











Notes: This figure shows the effect of an increase in the lending rate on the payoff
to entrepreneurs and banks. An increase in the lending rate 1-to-1 maps to an
increase in firm’s default threshold xt+1. The top-right shaded area is the marginal
benefit arising from larger loan repayment. The bottom-left dotted area is the
marginal cost arising from higher probability of default.
Figure 1.1: The Tradeoff of Increasing Lending Rate on Bank’s Revenue
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of the lending rate, as shown in Figure (1.2). This concave relationship implies that
there exists a maximum for bank’s expected revenue, and the bank cannot earn more
than this maximum value for any lending rate. Result 1 summarizes this finding
and characterizes this turning point:13
Result 1. There exists a unique value x∗t+1(σt) that maximizes the bank’s expected
revenue, i.e., x∗t+1(σt) = argmaxxt+1V
B

























The left-hand side of Equation (1.6) is the marginal benefit of raising x∗t+1: a
rise in the default threshold maps one-to-one into an increase in the loan rate, which
increases the total amount of revenue from non-defaulting firms. This marginal
benefit is depicted as the shaded area in Figure 1.1. The right-hand side is the
marginal cost of raising x∗t+1: it increases the share of defaulting firms and leads to
more deadweight loss. The marginal cost is depicted as the dotted area in Figure
1.1. We denote as V
B




t (σt; C) = SB(x∗t+1(σt), σt)Rkt+1Qtkt+1 (1.7)
13As pointed out by Bernanke et al. [1999], the concavity requires some regularity conditions on
the distribution function. In particular, the hazard function x → xf(x)1−F (x) must be an increasing







Notes: This figure shows that the bank’s expected revenue is an inverse-U shaped
function of the lending rate. For any given σ, there exists a unique value x∗(σ)
that yields a maximum expected revenue for the bank.
Figure 1.2: Bank’s Expected Revenue as a Function of Lending Rate
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Moreover, there is a monotonic relationship between the borrower’s risk and
the bank’s maximum expected revenue, summarized as follows:
Result 2. The bank’s maximum expected revenue V
B
t (σt; C) is decreasing in the
entrepreneur’s risk, i.e., ∂V
B
t (σt; C)/∂σt < 0.
The intuition is as follows. In debt contracts lenders’ revenue is concave in
the total project return. Consider an increase of risk in a mean-preserving manner.
A higher volatility of the entrepreneur’s return increases the left-tail risk, creating
more default and hence lowering the lender’s expected revenue. At the same time,
the increase in right-tail risk does not benefit the lender because the loan repay-
ment amount is predetermined. Overall, an increase in project volatility lowers
the lender’s expected revenue. Figure 1.3 plots the banks’ expected revenue as a
function of the borrower productivity default threshold for different borrower risk
levels.
The inverse correlation between banks’ maximum expected revenue and en-
trepreneurs’ risk has implications for banks’ participation in lending. As borrowers’
risk rises, on the one hand, the bank’s maximum expected revenue continues to fall.
On the other hand, the bank’s funding cost does not vary with borrowers’ risk. At
some point, risk will reach a point at which the bank’s cost of funds exceeds the
bank’ highest possible revenue, in which case lending becomes absolutely unprof-
itable. The bank will stop lending to this borrower, and any other borrowers who
are riskier. Formally, we characterize the bank’s lending rule as follows:
Result 3. There exists a unique value σt at period t such that it is optimal for banks
19
to reject borrowers whose risk is higher than σt.




t (σt; C) = SB(x∗t+1(σt), σt)Rkt+1Qtkt+1 = RFt+1bt (1.8)
The left-hand side of Equation (1.8) is the bank’s maximum expected revenue
from lending to a borrower with risk σt. The right hand side is the bank’s cost of
funds RFt+1 multiplied by loan amount bt. Note that the risk threshold σt decreases in
the bank’s cost of funds RFt+1. That is, when banks’ funding cost goes up, banks will
lower the risk threshold so as not to lose money on their most risky borrowers. The
determination of the risk threshold crucially depends on the bank’s funding cost,
which in turn is affected by its balance sheet condition. Therefore, we incorporate
this mechanism into the general equilibrium model in what follows.
14It is worth noting that bank could continue to satisfy equation (1.8) by reducing bt as borrowers’
σ rises, in which case borrowers with σt > σt would be quantity (partial) rationed but not entirely
rejected. We focus on the equilibrium with binary outcome (rejection or full funding) in this paper,
and leave the case with partial rationing to future studies.
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Notes: This figure shows bank’s maximum expected revenue is decreasing in
borrower’s risk. The risk threshold σ is determined when the maximum expected
revenue is equal to bank’s funding costs.
Figure 1.3: Banks’ Expected Revenue for Different Borrowers’ Risk Levels
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We interpret the risk threshold σt as a bank’s lending standards. Such a cut-
off lending rule is not uncommon in practice. In mortgage markets, for example,
mortgage lenders require that borrowers must meet a sharply defined minimum
credit score in order to qualify for a mortgage. Lenders deny credit to borrowers
whose risk is above the threshold.15
1.4 The General Equilibrium Model
In this section, I embed the partial equilibrium results into a general equi-
librium model. The main goal of this section is to investigate dynamic effects of
changes in banks balance sheet conditions on lending standards and aggregate vari-
ables. All price and aggregate variables mentioned in the partial equilibrium setting
will be endogenously determined in equilibrium.
The full model economy is composed of five types of agents: households, en-
trepreneurs (firms), banks, capital producers, and a mutual fund. On the financial
side, the model structure is as follows. Households lend to the mutual fund in the
form of deposits. The mutual fund uses the funds to lend to banks in the form of
short-term debt. Banks combine this external funding and their own accumulated
net worth to provide funding for entrepreneurs in the form of debt. Entrepreneurs
combine the bank loans and their own accumulated net worth to start firms and
produce goods. The main market frictions, as we mentioned in the section above,
are the existence of CSV between banks and firms and also between banks and the
15Laufer and Paciorek [2016] document similar lending patterns in US mortgage markets. They
find that lenders set minimum thresholds for consumers’ FICO credit scores, and adjust the thresh-
old values based on economic and financial conditions.
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mutual fund. This new upper layer of CSV enables us to study the balance sheet
dynamics of banks.
Similar to Gertler and Kiyotaki [2010], we adopt the island economy setup by
assuming that banks and entrepreneurs are segmented across a continuum of islands.
There is a representative bank in each island, providing financial intermediation
services to the entrepreneurs located in the same island. The mutual fund operates
economy-wide and diversifies perfectly across islands. Labor and consumption goods
are also perfectly mobile.
We now analyze the behavior of each type of agent, and define the equilibrium.
1.4.1 Entrepreneurs
As we mentioned in Section 1.3, an entrepreneur operates a firm with a linear
production technology QtKj,t+1 → εj,t+1zt+1Rkt+1QtKj,t+1. In this section, I formally
present the entrepreneur’s problem, describe the sources of shocks and determine
the common return of capital Rkt+1.
1.4.1.1 Technology
There is a continuum of entrepreneurs of measure one on each island, and each
entrepreneur manages a firm indexed by j.16 Firms are perfectly competitive. They
are the consumption goods producers in this economy. All firms operate the same
constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production function using effective capital








where At+1 is the labor-augmented total factor productivity (TFP), and Yj,t+1,
k̃j,t+1, and Lj,t+1 are the individual firm’s output, effective capital, and labor de-
mand, respectively.
At time t, firm j purchases raw capital, denoted by kj,t+1, for use at t+1. The
actual quantity of capital that can be used for production at time t+ 1, denoted by
the effective capital k̃j,t+1, is random. In particular, for kj,t+1 units of capital firm
j purchases at time t, the total amount of effective capital ready for production at
time t+ 1 is k̃j,t+1 = xj,t+1kj,t+1, where xj,t+1 is a composition of two shocks to firm
j’s capital stock. Specifically, xj,t+1 comprises a firm-specific shock component εj,t+1
and an island-wide shock component zt+1, and xj,t+1 = εj,t+1zt+1.
17 The firm has
(1− δ)k̃j,t+1 units of undepreciated capital available for resale after production.18
1.4.1.2 Labor Choice and Firm Value
At time t+1, firm j chooses labor after the realization of the idiosyncratic and
the island-wide shocks, given the capital stock purchased from last period. Hence,
we can solve the firm’s labor choice through a static profit maximization problem.
17In contrast to the partial equilibrium model where zt+1 denotes the aggregate shock since there
is only one representative bank, now we denote zt+1 as an island-wide shock that will only affect
the bank in this island. In essence, the zt+1 shock captures the undiversifiable risk in a bank’s
loan portfolio.
18The capital quality shocks capture the risk in operating actual business ventures. Similar
shocks are seen in Gertler and Kiyotaki [2010], Christiano et al. [2014], and Gourio [2013]. Chris-
tiano et al. [2014], for example, explains that “in the hands of some entrepreneurs, a given amount
of raw capital (e.g., metal, glass, and plastic) is a great success (e.g., the Apple iPad or the
Blackberry cell phone), and in other cases, it is less successful (e.g., the NeXT computer or the
Blackberry Playbook).”
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Given the capital stock, the aggregate wage and the realized shocks, firm j chooses















Let V Ej,t+1 denote firm j’s total value at period t + 1 after production (but before
making loan repayments), where the superscript E denotes entrepreneur. The en-
trepreneur who experienced shock xj,t+1 is left with (1−δ)xj,t+1kj,t+1 units of capital
after depreciation. This capital is sold in competitive markets at the price Qt+1.
Hence firm j’s value is the sum of maximized profit plus the value of undepreciated
effective capital: V Ej,t+1 = Πj,t+1 + (1 − δ)Qt+1k̃j,t+1. Substituting for the optimal




























t+1Qtkj,t+1. That is, firm j’s individual return on raw capital is the prod-





In each island there exists a representative bank. Each entrepreneur applies
for a business loan from the bank located in the same island. Banks apply the
lending rule as determined in section 1.3 to decide on whether to reject borrowers.
Given this lending standard, I describe the determination of bank’s loan portfolio,
bank’s financing problem and default decisions in this subsection.
When banks decide on lending standards they have full information on the
distribution of borrowers’ risk, which is the time-invariant distribution H(σt). In
other words, the determination of σt does not depend on any individual borrower’s
risk. I assume the following information structure in implementing the lending
standards.
Assumption 1. Banks can only detect whether a given applicant’s risk σj is above or
below its chosen risk threshold; banks cannot observe the exact value of the borrower’s
risk σj.
This assumption implies that all approved borrowers appear identical to the
bank. As a result, all qualified borrowers receive the same credit contract.19 En-
19This assumption reduces the computational burden of the model without altering the main
insight. Without this imperfect screening assumption, banks would offer a continuum of lending
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trepreneurs do not have information about their project’s risk and the cost of apply-
ing for a bank loan is negligible. Hence, each entrepreneur will apply for a loan and
there is no signaling about their risk type in equilibrium. For borrowers that are
approved for credit, we can therefore drop the individual entrepreneur’s subscript
j from bj,t and kj,t+1 so that bt = bj,t and kt+1 = kj,t+1.
20 Entrepreneurs that are
denied credit have to run their businesses using their own net worth.
1.4.2.1 Loan Portfolio and Bank Default
The bank provides bt in loans to each qualified entrepreneur. The total size of





The integral over risk type is conditional on entrepreneurs being within the risk
threshold, i.e., dH(σj,t|σj,t < σt), because lending happens after the bank’s accep-
tance/rejection decision. The bank has equity NBt at the beginning of period t. To
finance the difference between its assets and equity, the bank must borrow from the
mutual fund. Similar to firms’ financing problem, we assume banks borrow from
the mutual fund in the form of debt. At period t + 1, banks will attempt to repay
the debt at its face value Rdt+1Dt. R
d
t+1 is banks’ borrowing rate. Note that since
rates based on the exact type of borrower they observe. In that case, the mechanism of this paper
would still work, since banks would still impose a maximum risk threshold that depends on the
bank’s cost of funds.
20This paper focuses on borrowers’ heterogeneity along the dimension of risk. Therefore, I
assume that entrepreneurs pool their net worth at the end of each period so that their starting
net worth is the same. In future research, it is worth exploring borrowers’ heterogeneity in the
dimension of net worth.
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bank debt is risky, there is a positive spread between banks’ borrowing rate and the





Conditional on the realization of zt+1 and on being qualified, the expected value to
the bank of an individual loan extended at period t to entrepreneur j is
∫ σ̄t
a
SB(xt+1, zt+1, σj,t)dH(σj,t|σj,t < σt)Rkt+1Qtkt+1
Summing over all approved borrowers, we obtain the total value of the bank’s loan












kt+1dH(σj,t) is the total capital purchased by bank-financed en-
trepreneurs.
V Bt+1 is increasing in the aggregate shock zt+1. When the realized aggregate
shock is sufficiently low, the bank’s total value of assets falls below the total value
of its liabilities, in which case the bank defaults. Due to the monotonic relation-
ship between zt+1 and the bank’s revenue, there exists a unique value, z
∗
t+1, below
which the bank is insolvent and subsequently will default. Banks’ threshold, z∗t+1,
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is uniquely determined by
[∫ σ̄t
a







The right hand side of Equation (1.17) is the total liability at period t+1: the
bank needs to pay its debt Dt to the mutual fund at a gross interest rate R
d
t+1.
1.4.3 The Mutual Fund
The mutual fund takes deposits from the household and lends to a continuum
of banks. The mutual fund can diversify over the island-specific shocks, so that















where 0 < µB < 1 is the monitoring cost when banks default. The first term of the
above expression is banks’ full payment when not in default, i.e., the face value of
bank’s debt Rdt+1Dt. When banks default, however, banks’ debt holders claim the
banks’ assets, net of the proportional monitoring cost µB, denoted by the second
term. Equation (1.18) states that the total revenue from lending to banks must be
at least as large as the cost of paying household deposits at the risk-free interest
rate Rt.
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1.4.4 The Financial Contracts
We can now specify the joint optimization problem and determine the financial
contract. Agents choose {xt+1, bt} to maximize the expected profit of entrepreneurs
who are approved for credit, subject to the participation constraints of banks and
the mutual fund. In other words, banks choose the risk threshold according to (1.8),
and then {xt+1, bt} are chosen to maximize the expected profit of entrepreneurs who
fall within the risk threshold.
An entrepreneur’s share of the return from the project is max {εt+1zt+1Rkt+1Qtkt+1−













SE(xt+1, σj,t)dH(σj,t|σj,t < σt)Rkt+1Qtkt+1
]
(1.19)








)zt+1dF (ε;σj,t)dG(zt+1) denotes the ex-
pected share of the project return owned by an entrepreneur, conditional on partic-
ular realized values for risk σj,t.
21There is also a participation constraint for entrepreneurs, which requires the expected profit
from taking the financial contract should be at least as large as investing entreprenuers’ net worth




SE(xt+1, σj,t)dH(σj,t|σj,t < σt)
]
Rkt+1Qtkt+1 ≥ Rt(Qtkt+1 − bt)
We assign a Lagrange multiplier to this constraint when solving the model and find that the multi-
plier is non-zero in our calibration, which implies that constraint is not binding and entrepreneurs
always participate in the financial contract.
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The bank’s participation constraint is that the expected revenue from total
loans, net of the payment to the bank’s debt holders, is at least as large as the
opportunity cost of bank equity, which would otherwise earn the risk-free interest











SB(xt+1, zt+1, σj,t)dH(σj,t|σj,t < σt)dG(zt+1)Rkt+1Qtkt+1 − (1−G(z∗t+1))RFt+1bt
(1.20)
The outside integral sums over realizations of the aggregate shock zt+1 that are
above z∗t+1, in which case the bank does not default. The bank’s total expected












where RFt+1 is the bank’s funding cost. Note that R
F
t+1 is an implicit cost, which is
not the interest rate on any loan contract.22 It is determined by the participation
constraint of banks’ shareholders:
(1−G(z∗t+1))(RFt+1Bt −Rdt+1Dt) = RtNBt (1.22)
22Note that RF , the bank’s cost of funds, is not the same as Rd, which is the interest rate on
banks’ debt. This is because that banks’ funding is composed of both internal net worth and
external debt, which have different costs. The cost of internal net worth is the opportunity cost of
investing at the risk-free interest rate.
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where the bank default threshold z∗t+1 is defined in Equation (1.17). The optimal
financial contract is a set {xt+1, bt} such that it maximizes entrepreneurs’ profit in
(1.19) subject to banks’ zero profit condition in (1.23), where Rdt+1 is determined
by the mutual fund’s participation constraint in (1.18) and the threshold value of
banks’ default z∗t+1 is determined in (1.17), conditional on banks’ risk threshold σt
in (1.8).
The optimality conditions of the financial contract are documented in Ap-
pendix (A.2).
1.4.5 Households
Households’ problem is standard. There is a unit measure of identical house-
holds in this economy. The representative household chooses consumption Ct, labor
supply LHt and deposit saving D
H


















t + Πt (1.24)
where U(·) is the period felicity utility, Rt the risk-free interest rate, Wt the wage
rate, and Πt the total profits and dividends transferred from the entrepreneurs and
banks. The first order conditions with respect to consumption, labor, and savings
yield the following optimality conditions:
Et(Mt+1Rt) = 1 (1.25)
UC(Ct, L
H
t )Wt = UL(Ct, L
H
t ) (1.26)





1.4.6 New Capital Producers
The perfectly competitive capital producer transforms final consumption goods
into capital. The production of new capital is subject to adjustment costs. In
particular, capital producers take (1 + S( It
It−1
))It consumption goods and transform
them into It investment goods that are sold at price Qt. S(
It
It−1
) is the convex
adjustment cost, which satisfies S(1) = S ′(1) = 0 and S ′′(1) ≡ ζ > 0. The capital









where M0,t is the stochastic discount factor. The first order condition of the capital
producer’s optimization problem is





















By the law of large numbers, the aggregate profit of all firms at the end of



































The evolution of net worth in this paper closely follows Christiano et al. [2014].
Entrepreneurs’ net worth in period t+ 1 is comprised of retained earnings and labor
income. Entrepreneurs are assumed to supply LE units of labor inelastically each
period. This is a standard assumption in the literature to ensure equity always
being positive. I assume that entrepreneurs have unit measure and that they pool
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resources at the end of each period. I also assume that entrepreneurs retain a
fraction γE of earnings and rebate the remaining share (1 − γE) as a dividend to
households. Therefore, the net worth of an entrepreneur at the start of period t+ 1




Profits rebated to households as dividends are:
ΠEt = (1− γE)V Et






SB(xt, z, σ)dG(z)dH(σ|σ < σt)RktK
f
t − (1−G(z∗t ))RdtDt−1
At the end of each period, banks pay a fraction (1−γB) of their profits as dividends
to the household. The remaining fraction γB is injected into new equity as retained
earnings. The banker supplies LB units of labor inelastically. Banks’ equity at the
start of period t+ 1 is the sum of retained earnings and bankers’ labor income:
NBt+1 = γ
BV Bt +WtL
B; ΠBt = (1− γB)V Bt
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1.4.8 Market Clearing
In the labor market, aggregate labor supply is the sum of labor supply from
households, entrepreneurs, and bankers. Aggregate labor demand is the sum of labor
demand from firms receiving external financing plus labor demand from self-financed
firms. Therefore, the labor market clearing condition is: Lt = L
H
t + L
E + LB. The




t . The funds market clears when household deposits
equal the mutual fund’s total lending, i.e., Dt = D
H
t . Lastly, the economy-wide
resource constraint is given by



















Θ(It) is the capital adjustment cost. The last two terms on the right-hand side of
Equation (1.31) reflect the resources used for monitoring defaulting firms and banks,
respectively.
The complete list of optimality conditions is documented in Appendix (A.2).
1.5 Calibration
1.5.1 Choosing Parameters
The model is calibrated to the United States economy at a quarterly frequency.
The calibration strategy is designed to ensure that steady state conditions of the
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model match with their data counterparts. The calibrated parameters can be divided
into two groups. The parameters in the first group (the top panel in Table 1.1) either
have direct data counterparts or are standard in the literature. The parameters in
the second group (the bottom panel in Table 1.1) are particular to this model, and
usually do not have direct data counterparts. For this set of parameters, the values
are jointly calibrated so that the model matches a set of relevant moments from the
data.
Parameter Value Description Source/Target
β 0.996 Discount factor the risk-free rate R = 1.6%
α 0.35 Capital share in firm production Standard RBC
δ 0.025 Capital depreciation rate Standard RBC
ϕ 1 Inverse labor supply elasticity Comin and Gertler [2006]
ζ 0.5 Investment adjustment costs Jermann and Quadrini [2012]
h 0.7 Consumption habits Smets and Wouters [2007]
ψL 0.3 Disutility weight on labor labor supply at 1/3 units
LE 0.01 Entrepreneurs’ labor supply Christiano et al. [2014]
LB 0.01 Bankers’ labor supply Christiano et al. [2014]
Table 1.1: Calibration I: Standard Parameters












with 0 < β < 1, 0 < h < 1 and ψL, ϕ > 0. This preference specification is standard
in the literature. It allows for habit formation to capture consumption dynamics
(e.g., Gertler and Karadi [2011]). The capital adjustment cost is assumed to take
the functional form S(x) = 1
2
ζ(x− 1)2. In equilibrium, ζ is the inverse elasticity of


















































































































































































































































































































































































































The first group of parameters are chosen as follows. The household discount
rate is set to β = 0.996, implying an approximately 1.6% annual risk-free interest
rate. The share of capital in output production is α = 0.35, and the capital depre-
ciation rate δ is equal to 0.025, which are both standard values in the Real Business
Cycle (RBC) literature. I set the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply ϕ
at unity, which represents an intermediate value for the range of estimates across
micro and macro literature. It is also in line with other macroeconomic studies
(e.g., Comin and Gertler [2006]). The investment adjustment cost parameter ζ is
set to 0.5 as in Jermann and Quadrini [2012]. The consumption habit parameter h
is estimated to be 0.71 in Smets and Wouters [2007] and 0.65 in Christiano et al.
[2005]. I set h equal to 0.7. I calibrate ψL so that households’ labor supply L
H is
equal to 1/3 in the steady state, capturing a standard eight hour work day. The
labor supply of entrepreneurs and bankers plays a minimal role in the consumption
goods production process, but it is important to include them since it ensures both
agents having non-zero initial net worth in case of default. Following Christiano
et al. [2014], I assign a small value, 0.01, to both parameters.
Parameters in the second group do not have direct data counterparts and hence
are not individually identifiable. Instead, there are a set of model objects depending
on these parameters in the steady state. The calibration strategy is to choose these
parameters jointly so that the values of model objects are as close as possible to
the values of their data counterparts. The group of data moments and their sources
are described as follows. Data on loan approval rates is from the Small Business
Credit Survey conducted by the New York Federal Reserve Bank and the National
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Federation of Independent Business(NFIB). The average loan approval rate since
2012 is 78%.23 The leverage ratio of the corporate business sector, i.e., the asset-to-
equity ratio, is close to 2 in the aggregate following Gertler and Kiyotaki [2010]. I
obtain the leverage ratio of the financial sector using aggregate bank balance sheet
data from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The average leverage
ratio, defined as the asset-to-equity ratio, of the U.S. banking sector is 13.7 for
all FDIC-insured commercial banks and savings institutions from 1990 to 2016.24
The corporate probability of default (PD) is 5.37% in the US as documented in
De Fiore and Uhlig [2011]. Using data from the FDIC bank default database, I
calculate the average PD of financial institutions from 1930 to 2016 as 0.8%.25 The
average financial funding spread, as measured by the spread between the average
US financial bond yield and the 3-month Treasury bill yield from 1990 to 2016,
is 2.74%.26 To assess the real cost of corporate borrowing, I follow the literature
and use the average corporate funding spread, as measured by the spread between
the Baa corporate bond yield and the 3-month Treasury bill yield, which is 4.22%
for the sample period 1990 to 2016.27 Loss given default (LGD) is a widely used
measure of credit risk. It measures the share of loans that are lost if a borrower
23The Small Business Credit Survey (SBCS) (https://www.newyorkfed.org/smallbusiness)
is an annual survey of small firms reporting on financing needs and outcomes. In 2015, the SBCS
yielded 5,420 responses from businesses in 26 states. The Survey starts from 2010, and I take the
average from 2012 to 2017, which yields the number 78%.
24The bank asset-to-equity ratio is calculated by dividing the series of Total Assets by the series
of Total Equity Capital.
25The dataset on failed banks can be downloaded from https://www.fdic.gov/bank/
individual/failed/.
26 The financial bond yield is measured by the series of US Credit Bond Yield (Finance) from
Citigroup Global Markets.
27 The data can be downloaded from Bloomberg. The name of the series is “Moody’s Seasoned
Baa Corporate Bond”.
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defaults. According to a recent study by FDIC, the average LGD for Commercial
and Industrial (C&I) loans is 49.3% from 2008 to 2013 (Shibut and Singer [2015]).
A summary on how model objects are mapped to the data is given in Table
(1.2). The model overall provides a good fit of the targeted moments.
1.5.2 Parameter Identification
I examine the identification of parameters by conducting an exercise similar to
Daruich [2018]. I use simulated method of moments to assess the relevance of our
chosen target moments for the identification of parameters. The model has seven
parameters that are internally calibrated to match seven data moments. The identi-
fication of some parameters relies on some key moments in the data. The identifica-
tion exercise is conducted as follows. First, I draw a vector of candidate parameter
values uniformly from the neighborhood of the calibrated value for N1 = 100, 000
times, and compute the implied moments in the model. Second, we associate each
parameter with a target moment as listed in Table 1.2. Now there are N1 simulated
values for each parameter, as well as for the associated moment. Third, the vector
of simulated values for each parameter is divided into N2 = 50 quantiles. For each
quantile, there are N1/N2 associated moments. I then compute the 25th, 50th, and
75th percentiles of the associated moment.
Figure (1.4) shows the identification of the key parameter σz, the standard
deviation of the aggregate shock. The figure conveys several pieces of information
about the identification. First, we claim that a moment is important for a param-
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eter’s identification if the “confidence band” (i.e., the difference between the 25th
and 75th percentiles) of the associated moment crosses the horizontal dotted line,
which is the value of the moment in the data. Second, we interpret the slope of the
confidence band as the sensitivity of the parameter to the associated moment. In
other words, a steeper curve implies that the moment is more informative. Third,
the width of the confidence band informs us about the relative importance of the
remaining parameters. A wide band suggests that other parameters are important
in affecting this moment. Figure (1.4) suggests that the moment of banks’ default
probability is informative in identifying the key parameter σz. Intuitively, a higher
variance of aggregate productivity makes it more likely that a bank will experience
a wave of correlated firm defaults, which in turn causes it to default on its debt to
the mutual fund.
1.6 Numerical Results
In this section, I numerically simulate the model economy to analyze its dy-
namic properties. The model is solved using local perturbation methods. I consider
a banking crisis experiment in which banks suffer a significant loss in their capital.
I first study the response of the economy to the shock in my full model. In partic-
ular, I highlight banks’ endogenous decisions in lending standards to illustrate the
mechanism. Then I show how the response of macroeconomic variables to the shock
is amplified and propagated through the endogenous lending standards channel. To
do so, I compare the impulse responses to the financial shock under the full model
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Notes: The figure shows the identification of parameter aggregate volatility σz using
the simulated method of moments. The black horizontal line is the value of banks’
probability of default in the data. The blue solid line is the 50th percentile of the
simulated moments for any given value of σz. Similarly, the red dotted lines are the
25th and the 75th percentile of the simulated moments.
Figure 1.4: Simulated Method of Moments
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with those from a benchmark model, in which banks do not adjust lending standards
and lend to all borrowers with a common loan contract.
1.6.1 Dynamic Effects of Financial Shocks
I simulate the response of the model economy to an exogenous shock that leads
to a 20% loss of equity in the banking sector.28 The shock can be interpreted as
unexpected losses in banks’ assets, such as losses in the sub-prime mortgage market,
which are not modeled explicitly in this paper.
Figure (1.5) presents the impulse response functions of bank variables to




, rises and evolves as the mirror image of bank equity, as shown in Panel
B. The response of the bank leverage ratio closely follows bank equity NB because
bank debt D, which equals the total deposits from households in equilibrium, mainly
responds to the risk-free interest rate in general equilibrium and hence cannot be
quickly adjusted. There will be more banks that are not able to repay their debt,
which pushes up banks’ default threshold z∗ and probability of default (G(z∗)), as
shown in Panel C. As a result, banks’ funding cost RF − R goes up (Panel D), as
banks’ debtors require a higher spread to cover the higher bank default risk. This
rise in the banks’ funding cost triggers our main mechanism – banks tighten their
lending standards and reject more borrowers (Panels E and F). It is worth noting
that the response of bank equity is hump-shaped. Bank equity declines further in
28Since banks in this model are identical ex-ante, it is equivalent to consider a shock to a
representative bank.
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Notes: The figure shows impulse response functions of aggregate variables to the
financial shock. The size of the shock is calibrated such that banks lose 20% of
equity.
Figure 1.5: IRFs to Financial Shock - Bank Variables
45
response to the initial impact. This is due to the fact that bank equity is accumu-
lated through retained earning, and when adverse shocks lower project return, it
also substantially reduces banks’ profitability.
Figure (1.6) presents the impulse response functions of aggregate variables to
the financial shock. My model captures two important channels that lead to the
decline in aggregate credit supply. One is the rejection channel aforementioned.
More borrowers are credit rationed and those rationed borrowers have to downsize
their projects without access to bank financing. The other channel is the conven-
tional price channel – firms’ borrowing credit spread increases as shown in Panel A.
Therefore, total borrowing declines (Panel B), which lowers investment (Panel C)
and output (Panel D).
1.6.2 Comparison with the Benchmark Model
In this section, I examine the amplification and propagation mechanism by
comparing the impulse response functions of the full model to those of a benchmark
model in which banks do not reject borrowers. The benchmark model is a BGG
model with an explicit banking sector, which is nested in the full model, with the only
difference being no rejection choice in banks’ problem. Such difference comes from
the assumption in the benchmark model that banks cannot observe any information
on borrowers’ risk when deciding on loan contracts, in contrast to the assumption
in the full model that banks have a binary signal on borrowers’ risk. Therefore,
in the benchmark model banks cannot differentiate borrowers in the loan contract.
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Notes: The figure shows impulse response functions of aggregate variables to the
financial shock. The size of the shock is calibrated such that banks lose 20% of
equity.
Figure 1.6: IRFs to Financial Shock - Aggregate Variables
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There will be no rejection and all entrepreneurs will take the same loan contract.
I recalibrate the benchmark model to ensure that bank and firm leverages are the
same in both models. The idea is to have both the corporate sector and the financial
sector in the same state (characterized by the leverage) whether the model has or
not lending standards. To do so, I alter values for LE and LB in the benchmark
model. Appendix A.2 provides a detailed description of the benchmark model.
Figure (1.7) presents the impulse response functions of several key variables to
the financial shock under both models. Panels A and B of Figure (1.7) demonstrate
two distinct channels in banks’ response to capital shortfalls. In the benchmark
model, banks do not reject borrowers; therefore the loan approval rate is 100% and
does not respond to the financial shock. Instead, banks respond by charging higher
lending rates, which raises firms’ borrowing credit spread. Panel B shows that firm
credit spreads increase by 40 basis points at their peak. The higher borrowing cost
in turn lowers firms’ credit demand and decreases total lending in equilibrium (Panel
D). As a result, investment and output fall as shown in Panels E and F. This is the
conventional price channel through which adverse financial shocks disrupt the real
economy.
In contrast, there is a distinct credit rejection channel in the full model. The
adverse shock to bank equity increases the share of loan applicants who are denied
credit by 8 percentage points relative to the steady state. Those rejected borrowers
are credit constrained, so they have to rely solely on their internal funds to invest.
This contributes to the decline in total loan supply (Panel D), investment (Panel
E), and output (Panel F). More importantly, loan rejection brings a compositional
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effect in the banks’ loan portfolio. The rejected borrowers are those with high risk.
When banks reject more applicants, the pool of approved borrowers becomes less
risky. This can be seen from Panel C, which shows that the fraction of default-
ing borrowers responds less in the full model compared to the benchmark model.
Therefore, banks can offer relatively lower loan interest rates to these safer borrow-
ers, putting downward pressure on the lending rate. Meanwhile, the pass through
of banks’ rising funding costs still generates upward pressure on loan interest rates.
The combined effect, as shown in Panel B, is that the lending rate still increases,
but not as much as it does in the benchmark model. Panel B shows that the lending
rate increases by about 25 basis points at its peak, less than its peak response in the
benchmark model. This feature of my model echoes the motivation of this paper.
During the last financial crisis, interest rate spreads on bank loans only increased
mildly, while lending standards and loan rejection rates went up significantly. The
results of my model are consistent with these findings.
The full model with the rejection channel yields larger amplification and prop-
agation effects compared to the benchmark model. Panel E shows that the peak
investment decline in the full model is about double of that in the benchmark model.
Similarly, output in the full model decreases much more on impact, and the recovery
is significantly slower.
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Notes: The figure shows impulse response functions of bank and aggregate variables
to the financial shock. The size of the shock is calibrated such that banks lose 20%
of equity. Solid lines are from the full model with loan rejection. Dashed lines are
from the benchmark model without loan rejection.
Figure 1.7: IRFs to Financial Shock - Comparison
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1.7 Conclusion
The effect of changes in bank capital on the provision of bank credit is a
key determinant of the linkage between the financial sector and the real economy.
Understanding the underlying mechanisms has therefore been one of the most im-
portant research questions since the last financial crisis, and is also crucial for the
design of monetary and macro-prudential policies in central banks and other policy
institutions. This paper contributes to this line of research by concentrating on
a nonprice channel, namely the lending standards. In contrast to existing models
which mainly rely on price channels, this paper innovates by allowing banks to ad-
just lending standards. In the model, banks respond to adverse shocks not only by
charging higher interest rates, but also by adjusting lending standards and denying
credit applications.
In this paper, I propose a micro-founded theory in explaining banks’ decisions
on credit rejection. I embed this theory into a rich yet tractable quantitative DSGE
model. The calibrated model matches the average approval rate of business loans,
non-financial firms’ and banks’ probability of default and the loss given default of
bank loans. I conduct a counter-factual exercise where banks suffer 20% equity
losses, and compare dynamic responses in the full model to an otherwise identical
benchmark model without credit rejection. I find that, when banks can adjust both
the rejection margin and the interest rate margin as in the full model, responses of
lending spreads on interest rates are milder. As a substitute, the rejection rate on
bank loans increases significantly. This is consistent with the fact that interest rate
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spreads were relatively flat during the recent crisis. Overall, the simulation results
show that the credit rejection channel is quantitatively and qualitatively important
for amplifying financial shocks.
The mechanism in this paper can be extended to study the disproportional
impact on small and young businesses during the financial crisis and the contribution
of this impact to the slow recovery in the aftermath. One prediction from the
model is that the riskier firms are more likely to be credit rationed during the
downturn. This prediction can have a distributional effect on heterogeneous firms.
In particular, one can introduce a positive correlation between mean and variance in
the distribution of firms’ idiosyncratic productivity, to capture the idea that riskier
businesses tend to have better growth prospects on average. With this new feature,
the extended model would generate a misallocation of credit. Note that there is no
social cost to lending to all borrowers, even risky ones, from the social planner’s
standpoint. Such an extension would also enhance our results and is expected to
generate larger amplification.
Another possible avenue for future research is to examine how the mechanism
in this paper might alter the transmission of (unconventional) monetary policies,
relative to a model with only a price channel. For instance, during the last financial
crisis, the Federal Reserve, as well as central banks in many other countries, im-
plemented a number of programs to enhance the provision of funding to banks and
to taper banks’ rising cost of funds. One way to think about such policies in this
model is to introduce monetary policies that affect the interest rate that the mutual
fund pays on deposits. In a model with only a price channel, the effectiveness of
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such policies can be evaluated by only looking at firms’ borrowing spreads, which is
a sufficient statistic for accessing the distress in the credit market. In contrast, the
effect of such monetary policy in this paper’s model would be transmitted through
an additional channel, namely the credit rejection channel. For the same level of
declining in lending spreads, financial conditions are more relaxed if loan approval
rates increase.
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Chapter 2: Capital Gaps, Risk Premia Dynamics and the Macroe-
conomy (coauthored with Fabian Lipinsky and Malgo-
rzata Skibinska)1
2.1 Introduction
The financial crisis and ongoing financial policies demonstrate the challenges in
identifying and managing booms and busts in financial cycles. Alternating periods
of excessive credit growth and credit crunch caused by fluctuations in bank capital
have generated much concern on financial stability. Capital regulation as a result
has also moved from constant risk-based capital requirements, as in the 2004 Basel
II Accord, to a dynamic capital buffer framework as in the 2010 Basel III Accord.2
In this paper we develop a rich framework to explore the cyclical nature of bank
capital. We take a normative angle of bank capital analysis by asking what is the
”natural” level of capital (or leverage) that banks would choose optimally in the
absence of frictions. Through counterfactual exercises, we analyze how historical
levels of bank capital implied by the data deviate from model-computed natural
1Fabian Lipinsky: International Monetary Fund. Malgorzata Skibinska: Warsaw School of
Economics
2See Nguyen (2014), Begenau (2018), Van den Heuvel (2016), and Begenau and Landvoigt
(2017)
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levels, and further decompose bank capital gaps into the contributions of different
types of shocks. We lastly highlight the channels through which bank capital gaps
affect the real economy.
We nest two parallel economies under one unified framework. The only dif-
ference between the two economies lies in the capital structure choices.3 In the
calibrated economy, equity is not optimally chosen. Instead, we assume that equity
dynamics follows a law of motion a la Christiano et al. [2014]. We do not explicit
model which types of frictions that prevent equity from the optimal level. Equity
dynamics is calibrated to match the data. The other economy, which is termed
as the ”optimal” economy, features with optimal capital structure choices made by
both firms and banks. Equity in the optimal economy is endogenously determined
every period. In both economies, we focus on the interconnectedness between bor-
rowers’ and lenders’ balance sheet dynamics. Deteriorating borrower balance sheets
increases loan and security portfolio losses of lenders, weakening lenders’ balance
sheet conditions. At the same time, shortfall in financial intermediaries’ capital
leads to an increase in funding spreads of financial institutions, which is passed on
to non-financial firms reflected as a rise in credit spreads and a reduction of credit.
Hence, the various feedback effects between borrowers and lenders are not separa-
ble. This paper provides a framework to study the joint dynamics of their balance
sheets, default frequencies, and associated risk premia.
We introduce a theory of optimal capital structure into a standard real business
cycle framework. In this optimal economy, lenders (financial intermediaries) and
3We use equity, capital, and net worth interchangeably throughout this paper.
55
borrowers (non-financial firms) finance their expenditures by issuing equity and debt.
The extent of equity financing versus debt financing depends on the trade-offs of
each financing option. We depart from the Modigliani-Miller world, in which capital
structure is indeterminate. Instead, following the corporate finance literature, we
assume that debt has a tax advantage over equity, but there is a cost associated with
debt default.4 The tradeoff between expected default costs and the tax advantage
of debt generates an interior choice for the capital structure.
We use Bayesian methods as in An and Schorfheide (2007) to estimate the
model on a sample of US macroeconomic time series from 1991Q1 to 2016Q4. The
RBC model defined in this paper without financial frictions would have four shock
processes, and could be estimated with standard aggregate data series such as GDP,
consumption, investment and employment. In addition, we include two more shock
processes, representing idiosyncratic risk and aggregate risk, along with two ad-
ditional financial data series in our estimation, firms’ credit spreads and financial
funding spreads, to estimate how financial frictions in the model affect the macroe-
conomy.
Our econometric analysis finds that changes in both idiosyncratic risk and
aggregate risk are important drivers of business cycle fluctuations. Upon impact, a
surge in either risk shock creates a joint decline of investment, output, consumption
and employment, but through different channels. The main operating channel for
aggregate risk is through banks’ funding cost. An increase in aggregate risk raises
4In reality, interests payments on debt are deductible from taxable corporate income, while
firms’ earnings are taxable.
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the likelihood for banks to default. Banks’ debt holders consequently require larger
spreads on banks’ debt, which in turn passes on to banks’ lending spreads, reducing
the credit extended to the economy. On the other hand, the main operating channel
for idiosyncratic risk is through firms’ credit spreads. An increase in idiosyncratic
risk primarily leads to more firm (borrower) default, and hence generates higher
costs for firm borrowing.
Our counterfactual analysis shows that responses of macroeconomic and finan-
cial variables to a given shock is generally smaller in the optimal economy than in
the calibrated economy. Differences in the responses are larger in the case of risk
shocks than in the case of a standard productivity shock. Following an increase in
idiosyncratic (aggregate) risk, the fraction of defaulting firms (banks) rises, and firm
(bank) equity declines. In response, however, firms (banks) will issue more equity to
have a faster recovery in the optimal economy, whereas in the calibrated economy
equity is accumulated only through constant retained earnings and recovers slowly.
The differing speed in equity recovery has an impact on the dynamics of aggregate
variables. The impulse responses show that aggregate series of output, investment
and consumption in the optimal economy experience a milder magnitude of decline
than in the calibrated economy. For the productivity shock, differences in the im-
pulse responses between the two economies are almost negligible. This is because
the productivity shock does not have much influence on the balance sheets of firms
or banks.
We compute the historical evolution of bank capital gaps and conduct a vari-
ance decomposition analysis. We find that the bank capital gap exhibits counter-
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cyclicality in general. There was a spike in the gap during the 2008-2009 financial
crisis. The countercyclicality implied that banks’ actual level of capital was much
lower than their ”desired” level during the crisis period. We also find that aggregate
risk plays a significant role in driving the fluctuations of the bank capital gap.
2.2 Literature Review
This paper is related to the literature on bank capital requirements (Van den
Heuvel (2008), De Nicolo et al. (2014), Nguyen (2014), Begenau (2018), Van den
Heuvel (2016), Begenau and Landvoigt (2017)). The literature analyzes the welfare
impact of bank capital through a regulatory angle. This paper abstracts from market
frictions such as moral hazard that motivate the government intervention in the
literature. The only friction in the model is the monitoring cost that drives the
capital structure.
More broadly, this paper fits a strand of macroeconomic literature on the role
of financial intermediation in the development of economic crises, including the sem-
inal works of Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Bernanke,
Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), Gertler and Karadi
(2011), He and Krishnamurthy (2012), Di Tella (2013), and Brunnermeier and San-
nikov (2014).
This paper explores the role of uncertainty shocks in the dynamics of firms’
and banks’ balance sheets. Along the same line, Christiano et al. [2014] focus on the
impact of idiosyncratic risk shocks on firms’ funding costs. They find that the risk
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shock can account for approximately 60 percent of fluctuations in aggregate output.
Structure of the paper The paper is structured as follows. Section 2.3 describes
the model. Section 2.4 describes the estimation strategy and the data. We present
the quantitative results in section 2.5, and conclude in section 2.6.
2.3 The Model
Our model consists of a representative household, firms, financial intermedi-
aries (banks), and a mutual fund. Similar to Gertler and Kiyotaki [2010], firms are
located on islands. There is a representative bank in each island. Banks only lends
to firms in the same island, and borrow from the mutual fund. The mutual fund
takes deposit from the household and lend to banks.
2.3.1 Households
There is a unit measure of identical households in this economy. The repre-
sentative household chooses consumption Ct, labor supply L
H
t and deposit saving



















t + Πt (2.1)
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where U(·) is the period felicity utility, Rt the risk-free interest rate, Wt the wage
rate, and Πt the total profits and dividends transferred from the entrepreneurs and
banks. zc,t and zn,t are the preference and labor dis-utility shock, respectively.
Parameters β, h, ψL, and ϕ are the discount factor, a consumption habit parameter,
a scaling parameter on the marginal utility between consumption and labor, and
the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, respectively.
The first order conditions with respect to consumption, labor, and savings
yield the following optimality conditions:
Et(Mt+1Rt) = 1 (2.2)
UC(Ct, L
H
t )Wt = UL(Ct, L
H
t ) (2.3)
Mt+1 ≡ βUC(Ct+1, LHt+1)/UC(Ct, LHt ) (2.4)
where Mt+1 denotes the stochastic discount factor of households.
2.3.2 Firms
There is a continuum of perfectly competitive firms on each island, which are
identical ex ante and differ ex post only in their realization of idiosyncratic and
aggregate shocks. At the end of period t, new firms are born and purchase capital
Kt+1 for use in period t + 1. Firms finance capital expenditures by issuing equity
NFt and debt Bt+1. In period t + 1, after the realization of shocks, firms decide on
labor demand and production, and then sell back their capital in the competitive
capital market. At this point there are two possible scenarios: the firm value V Ft+1
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is larger than outstanding debt, in which case the firm is able to repay the debt in
full and all the remaining value goes to the equityholders as dividends; or the firm
value is less than outstanding debt. In this case debt holders have higher priority
than equityholders: debt holders will capture the firm value net of any bankruptcy
cost, and equityholders are wiped out.
2.3.2.1 Firm Production
Firms are perfectly competitive. They are the consumption goods producers
in this economy. All firms operate the same constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas





where At is the labor-augmented total factor productivity (TFP), and Yt,
K̃t, and Lt are the individual firm’s output, effective capital, and labor demand,
respectively. Since each firm is identical ex-ante and makes the same decision choices,
we suppress firm subscript j for simplicity so that the firm becomes representative.
At time t− 1, the entrepreneur purchases raw capital, denoted by Kt, for use
at t. The actual quantity of capital that can be used for production at time t,
denoted by the effective capital K̃t, is random. In particular, for Kt units of capital
the entrepreneur purchases at time t− 1, the total amount of effective capital ready
for production at time t is K̃t = xtKt, where xt is a composition of two shocks to
the firm’s capital stock. Specifically, xt comprises a firm-specific shock component
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εt and an island-wide shock component zt, and xt = εtzt. The firm has (1 − δ)K̃t
units of undepreciated capital available for resale after production.
2.3.2.2 Firm Value
At time t, the firm chooses labor after the realization of the idiosyncratic
shock and the island-wide shock, given the capital stock purchased from last period.
Hence, we can solve the firm’s labor choice through a static profit maximization
problem. Given the capital stock, the aggregate wage and the realized shocks, the















Let V Et denote the firm’s total value at period t after production (but before making
loan repayments), where the superscript E denotes entrepreneur. The entrepreneur
who experienced shock xt is left with (1− δ)xtKt units of capital after depreciation.
This capital is sold in competitive markets at the price Qt. Hence the firm’s value
is the sum of maximized profit plus the value of undepreciated effective capital:
V Et = Πt+(1− δ)QtK̃t. Substituting for the optimal labor demand and rearranging
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Therefore, we write the firm’s value in a compact expression as





That is, the firm’s individual return on raw capital is the product of the idiosyncratic




Let QtKt+1 be the firm’s capital expenditure. The firm finances the expendi-
ture partly through equity and partly through debt. We will discuss in detail in the












Figure 2.1: Firms’ Balance Sheet
The amount Bt is borrowed from the bank in the form of debt. The firm promises to
repay the bank at the face value Rbt+1Bt at time t+1, where R
b
t+1 is the gross interest
rate. After the realization of idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks at time t+ 1, if the
total value of the firm falls below the promised amount of debt repayment, the firm





≤ Rbt+1Bt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Loan repayment
(2.12)
I use xt+1 to denote the entrepreneur’s default threshold on total productivity, which
is a product of the idiosyncratic and aggregate shock, given by




For realizations of xt+1 above xt+1 the borrower pays R
b
t+1Bt to the bank. For real-
izations below xt+1, the bank seizes the borrower’s assets after paying a proportional
monitoring cost µE. Firms’ default can be attributed to an adverse idiosyncratic
shock εt+1 to the firm, or an adverse aggregate shock zt+1 affecting all firms, or a
combination of both. The two shocks have the same impact on an individual firm’s
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ability to repay its debt, but they have different implications for the bank, which
we will illustrate in the next section. Conditional on the aggregate shock zt+1, the
defaulting firms are those with realized idiosyncratic shocks lower than xt+1/zt+1.
In other words, xt+1/zt+1 is the default threshold for the idiosyncratic shock.
2.3.3 Financial Intermediaries
Financial intermediaries provide loans Bt to non-financial firms at gross lending rate
Rbt . Given the loan contract, the bank’s revenue from this contract is either R
b
tBt
when firms are able to make full repayment or the value of the firm when the firm





















The balance sheet of banks is shown below. The bank finances its asset Bt with debt
Dt and equity N
B





For a given loan contract, the bank’s revenue positively depends on the realized
value of aggregate shock zt+1. When the realized value of zt+1 is too low, the bank








Figure 2.2: Banks’ Balance Sheet
threshold value of the aggregate productivity z∗t+1 for bank default is characterized
by the following equation:
SB(xt+1, z∗t+1)Rkt+1QtKt+1 = Rdt+1Dt (2.15)
where SB(xt+1, z∗t+1) is banks’ realized share of the total return, conditional on the
realized value of z∗t+1, and R
d
t+1 is the interest rate on bank’s debt, which will be
determined in the mutual fund’s problem. This condition states that the realized
value of bank revenue (the left hand side of 2.15) is just paying off the debt borrowed
from the mutual fund (the right hand side of 2.15), leaving the whole equity being
wiped out.
2.3.4 The Mutual Fund
The mutual fund takes deposit from the household and lends to a continuum










where 0 < µB < 1 is the monitoring cost when banks default. The first term
of the above expression is banks’ full payment when not in default, i.e., the face
value of bank’s debt Rdt+1Dt. When banks default, however, banks’ debt holders
claim the banks’ assets, net of the proportional monitoring cost µB, denoted by the
second term. The left hand side is the present discounted value of total lending, and
the right hand side is its total lending. The equality sign indicates the break-even
condition for the mutual fund.
2.3.5 Joint Capital Structure Choice
In this section, we describe how capital structure is determined for both firms
and banks. Firms and banks finance their expenditure using both equity and debt.
We set up two cases in which the equity financing is determined in two different ways.
In the optimal capital structure, the amount of equity to issue is an endogenous
variable that agents (firms and banks) can choose each period. In the second case,
equity is not a choice variable. Instead, it follows a law of motion and is calibrated
to match the data.
2.3.5.1 Case I: Optimal Capital Structure
Firms finance expenditure partly with debt (bank loans) and partly with eq-
uity. Similar to Gourio [2013] and Jermann and Quadrini [2012], capital structure
in this paper is driven by the tradeoff between debt financing and equity financing.
Specifically, debt has a tax advantage over equity such that only the equity return
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is taxable, but debt holders are subject to default costs. Debt holders recover a
fraction 1− µE of the firm value upon default, where 0 < µE < 1 is the default cost
such as monitoring or verification costs. On the other hand, equityholders’ return
will be taxed at the rate of 0 < τ < 1.
Equity issuance is assumed to be costless. When µE = τ = 0, firms’ capital
structure is indeterminate. When τ = 0, the firm finances only through equity since
debt has no tax advantage. When µE = 0, the firm finances only through debt,
since default is not costly.

























t+1, Bt, Dt) to



















where z∗t+1 is characterized by the following equation:
SB(xt+1, z∗t+1)Rkt+1QtKt+1 = Rdt+1Dt (2.20)
2.3.5.2 Case II: Law of Motion for Equity
In this case, the financial contract is to choose {xt+1, Kt+1} to maximize en-






















SE(xt+1, zt+1)dG(zt+1) is entrepreneur’s expected share of
return, and subject to the bank’s participation constraint
SB(xt+1, z∗t+1)Rkt+1QtKt+1 − (1−G(z∗t+1))Rdt+1Dt = RtNBt (2.22)
where SB(xt+1, z∗t+1) ≡
∫∞
z∗t+1
SB(xt+1, zt+1)dG(zt+1) is banks’ expected share of re-
turn when they do not default. Rdt+1 is defined by the mutual fund’s zero profit
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condition, given by
(1−G(z∗t+1))Rdt+1Dt + (1− µB)SB(xt+1, z∗t+1)Rkt+1QtKt+1 = RtDt (2.23)
where SB(xt+1, z∗t+1) ≡
∫ z∗t+1
0
SB(xt+1, z)dG(z) is bank’s expected share of return
when it defaults. We can combine the above two constraints (with Lagrangian
multiplier λt+1 ) as
[
SB(xt+1, z∗t+1) + (1− µB)SB(xt+1, z∗t+1)
]
Rkt+1QtKt+1 = Rt(QtKt+1 −NEt ) (2.24)















is entrepreneurs’ asset-to-equity ratio, i.e., the leverage ratio. The
zero profit conditions on other agents put a constraint on the maximum leverage
of entrepreneurs. This characterization is isomorphic to the contracting problem
in Bernanke et al. [1999]. The difference is that there is an additional endogenous
variable z∗t+1 in the leverage ratio. The contract will also affect banks’ default
probability through the choice of z∗t+1, where z
∗
t+1 is characterized by the following
equation:
SB(xt+1, z∗t+1)Rkt+1QtKt+1 = Rdt+1(QtKt+1 −NEt −NBt ) (2.25)
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where SB(xt+1, z∗t+1) is banks’ realized share of return, conditional on the realized
value zt+1 = z
∗
t+1.
The optimal contract is to choose {xt+1, Kt+1} to maximize equation (2.21)
subject to equation (2.24), where z∗t+1 is defined by equation (2.25) and R
d
t+1 is
defined by equation (2.23). Let γt, λt and νt be the Langragian multipliers associated
with (2.23), (2.24) and (2.25), respectively.
The evolution of equity in this economy follows a law of motion as in Christiano
et al. [2014]. Firms’ net worth in period t+ 1 is comprised of retained earnings and
labor income. Entrepreneurs are assumed to supply LE units of labor inelastically
each period. This is a standard assumption in the literature to ensure equity always
being positive. I assume that entrepreneurs have unit measure and that they pool
resources at the end of each period. I also assume that entrepreneurs retain a
fraction γE of earnings and rebate the remaining share (1 − γE) as a dividend to
households. Therefore, the net worth of an entrepreneur at the start of period t+ 1




Profits rebated to households as dividends are:
ΠEt = (1− γE)V Et
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RktQtKt − (1−G(z∗t ))RdtDt−1
At the end of each period, banks pay a fraction (1−γB) of their profits as dividends
to the household. The remaining fraction γB is injected into new equity as retained
earnings. The banker supplies LB units of labor inelastically. Banks’ equity at the
start of period t+ 1 is the sum of retained earnings and bankers’ labor income:
NBt+1 = γ
BV Bt +WtL
B; ΠBt = (1− γB)V Bt
2.3.6 New Capital Producers
The perfectly competitive capital producer transforms final consumption goods
into capital. The production of new capital is subject to adjustment costs. In
particular, capital producers take (1 + S( It
It−1
))It consumption goods and transform
them into It investment goods that are sold at price Qt. S(
It
It−1
) is the convex
adjustment cost, which satisfies S(1) = S ′(1) = 0 and S ′′(1) ≡ ζ > 0. The capital









where M0,t is the stochastic discount factor. The first order condition of the capital
producer’s optimization problem is

























− 1)2 and zi,t is an exogenous shock to capital adjustment
cost.
2.3.7 Market Clearing
The funds market clears when household deposits equal the mutual fund’s
total lending, i.e., Dt = D
H
t . The economy-wide resource constraint holds when the
total output equals to the sum of total consumption, investment plus adjustment
costs.
2.4 Parameterization
In this section, we discuss how we set values for parameters in the model. We fit the
second model economy, i.e. the model with the law of motion equity, with data on
the United States economy on a quarterly basis. The premise We separate param-
eters into two groups. In the first group, parameters are set to follow conventional
values in the literature. Parameters in the second group are estimated with standard
Bayesian estimation techniques as in An and Schorfheide (2007). The estimation
strategy works as follows. We estimate parameters governing the exogenous shocks.
The model is matched to the data by maximizing the likelihood of observing the re-
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alized data. We use four macroeconomic and two financial variables to identify these
parameters. The macroeconomic series include output, consumption, employment
and investment. We add two additional financial variables, firms’ credit spreads
(Rb − R) and banks’ funding spreads (Rd − R), to match the financial side of the
model economy.
We use US quarterly data between 1991Q1 to 2016Q3. GDP, consumption and
investment data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The data on employ-
ment is from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Firms’ credit spread is computed as the
difference between the Baa corporate bond yield and the constant 1-year treasury
bond yield. The financial credit spread is computed as the difference between the
average US financial bond yield and the 3-month Treasury bill yield.
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Notes: The figure shows the six data series used for estimation. All series are
detrended. The four macroeconomic series are quarterly growth rates. Shaded areas
denote NBER recessions.
Figure 2.3: Data Series for Estimation
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2.4.1 Calibrated Parameters
Table 2.1 shows externally calibrated parameters. These parameters follow
standard values in the literature. The tax rate τ = 0.2 is similar to the tax rate on
capital gains. The default cost parameter µ = 0.5 reflects that the average recovery
rate of bank loans is about 50%.
Parameter Value Description
β 0.996 Discount factor
α 0.35 Capital share in firm production
δ 0.025 Capital depreciation rate
ϕ 1 Inverse labor supply elasticity
ζ 0.5 Investment adjustment costs
h 0.7 Consumption habits
ψL 0.3 Disutility weight on labor
µ 0.5 Default cost
τ 0.2 Tax rate
Table 2.1: Calibrated Parameters
2.4.2 Estimated Parameters
We feed the model six data series and estimate six shock processes in total.
All exogenous shocks follow an auto-regressive progress of order one: productivity
At, preferences zc,t, labor disutility zn,t, investment zi,t, idiosyncratic risk σε,t, and
aggregate risk σz,t. We estimate the autocorrelation coefficients ρ and the standard
deviations of each shock. Additionally, we estimate the steady state level of id-
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iosyncratic risk σε,ss and aggregate risk σz,ss. The innovations εj,t follow a standard
normal distribution.
ln(At) = ρAln(At−1) + σAεA,t (2.28)
ln(zc,t) = ρcln(zc,t−1) + σcεc,t (2.29)
ln(zn,t) = ρnln(zn,t−1) + σnεn,t (2.30)
ln(zi,t) = ρiln(zi,t−1) + σiεi,t (2.31)
ln(σε,t) = (1− ρε)ln(σε,ss) + ρεln(σε,t−1) + σεεε,t (2.32)
ln(σz,t) = (1− ρz)ln(σz,ss) + ρzln(σz,t−1) + σzεz,t (2.33)
Table 2.2 summarizes the priors and also reports the posterior modes and standard
deviations of the estimated parameters. The choice of the priors (mean and distri-
bution) for the parameters of the model follows standard literature (Del Negro et al.
[2011], Christiano et al. [2014]). Autocorrelation coefficients are assumed to follow
beta distributions with Beta(0.9, 0.2) priors. The priors on the standard deviations
of the innovations are inverse-gammas of type 2 with InvGamma(0.01, 0.002). We
set the priors for the steady state levels of idiosyncratic risk and aggregate risk as
N(0.2, 0.025) and N(0.1, 0.025), respectively.
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Parameter Description Prior Post Post Dist.
mean mode Std. Dev.
Autocorr. Coefficients
ρA technology shock 0.9 0.8804 0.0293 beta
ρc preference shock 0.9 0.9367 0.0469 beta
ρi investment shock 0.9 0.7535 0.0522 beta
ρn labor shock 0.9 0.9634 0.0170 beta
ρF idiosyn. risk shock 0.9 0.9250 0.0216 beta
ρB agg. risk shock 0.9 0.9700 0.0124 beta
Standard Deviations
σA technology shock 0.010 0.0077 0.0005 invg
σc preference shock 0.010 0.0087 0.0016 invg
σi investment shock 0.010 0.0313 0.0048 invg
σn labor shock 0.010 0.0174 0.0011 invg
σε idiosyn. risk shock 0.010 0.0190 0.0025 invg
σz agg. risk shock 0.010 0.0327 0.0040 invg
Steady State
σε,ss idiosyn. risk shock 0.200 0.2759 0.0157 norm
σz,ss agg. risk shock 0.100 0.1361 0.0091 norm
Table 2.2: Priors and Posterior Estimates for the Model Parameters
2.5 Quantitative Results
In this section we describe the impulse responses of macroeconomic and finan-
cial variables to various single-factor shocks. We show how these macroeconomic
variables respond differently in the counterfactual economy where capital structures
are optimally chosen (we call this the “optimal economy”), compared to the esti-
mated model using real data (we call it the “estimated economy”). We then conduct
historical decompositions of financial variables to compare the importance of various
shocks in driving the fluctuations of these variables.
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2.5.1 Impulse Responses
We use the estimated model to simulate responses of four aggregate variables
and two key financial variables to shocks. We consider a one standard-deviation
increase in the TFP shock, the idiosyncratic risk shock and the aggregate risk shock,
respectively. We conduct a counterfactual analysis for each shock by comparing
impulse responses of variables in the estimated economy and the optimal economy.
The difference between these two economies lie in how firms’ and banks’ capital
structures are determined. In the estimated economy, firm equity and bank equity
both follow a law of motion, that is calibrated to match the observed data. In the
optimal economy, on the other hand, firms and banks optimally determine their
debt/equity levels each period.
Figure (2.4) shows the impulse responses to a one standard-deviation increase
in the idiosyncratic risk shock. In the calibrated economy, when idiosyncratic risk
rises by one standard deviation, the variance of idiosyncratic productivity increases.
Firms’ probability of default increases by about 0.5 percentage points. This pushes
up firms’ credit spread by 6 percentage points. As credit becomes more expensive,
firms borrow less and investment subsequently falls by 1 percent on impact and fur-
ther deteriorates to a trough of about 2 percent. In comparison, the counterfactual
economy shows a smaller impact response to the same shock. In particular, firm
equity drops but by a lesser extent (about 0.7% compared to 1.6% in the calibrated
economy ). Firms’ default probability and credit spread increase by a relatively
smaller amount, although the differences diminish after several quarters. Similarly,
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the bank issues equity to buffer the adverse shock. Bank equity rises after the first
few quarters, which has a positive impact on bank’s default probability and con-
sequently on bank’s funding spread. Therefore, the overall impact on output and
investment is smaller in the optimal economy.
Figure (2.5) shows the impulse responses to a one standard deviation increase
in the aggregate risk shock. Following an increase in the aggregate productivity
variance, the probability of default for banks increase by 0.65 percentage points.
Bank funding spreads rise by about 6.6 percentage points. Higher financial distress
is passed to the real economy. Firms’ credit spreads abruptly increase by about 9
percentage points, which has a strong adverse impact on the aggregate economy.
We also show the impulse responses to a standard productivity shock in Figure
(2.6). The responses of financial variables show a much smaller magnitude compared
to the responses to risk shocks. For instance, a one standard-deviation increase in
productivity shock raises firms’ credit spread by roughtly 3 percentage point, and
bank funding spread by about 1 percentage point. These two numbers are 9 and 7
percentage points in the aggregate risk shock case, respectively. Additionally, the
counterfactual analysis shows the difference between the optimal economy and the
calibrated economy is fairly mild in the productivity case, suggesting that capital
structures do not matter for the standard productivity shock.
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Notes: The figure shows the impulse responses to a one standard-deviation increase
in the idiosyncratic risk shock. Values for the persistence and the standard
deviation of the shock are based on the posterior mode from the Bayesian
estimation. The black solid line represents the estimated economy. The red dash
line represents the counterfactual optimal economy where capital structures are
optimally chosen. The horizontal axis denotes quarters. The vertical axis denotes
the percent (or percentage point) deviation from the steady state value .
Figure 2.4: Impulse Response Functions to Idiosyncratic Risk Shock
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Notes: The figure shows the impulse responses to a one standard-deviation increase
in the aggregate risk shock. Values for the persistence and the standard deviation
of the shock are based on the posterior mode from the Bayesian estimation. The
black solid line represents the estimated economy. The red dash line represents the
counterfactual optimal economy where capital structures are optimally chosen. The
horizontal axis denotes quarters. The vertical axis denotes the percent (or
percentage point) deviation from the steady state value .
Figure 2.5: Impulse Response Functions to Aggregate Risk Shock
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Notes: The figure shows the impulse responses to a one standard-deviation increase
in the productivity shock. Values for the persistence and the standard deviation of
the shock are based on the posterior mode from the Bayesian estimation. The black
solid line represents the estimated economy. The red dash line represents the
counterfactual optimal economy where capital structures are optimally chosen. The
horizontal axis denotes quarters. The vertical axis denotes the percent (or
percentage point) deviation from the steady state value .
Figure 2.6: Impulse Response Functions to Productivity Shock
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2.5.2 Historical Decomposition
This section describes the historical decomposition of output growth and financial
variables into the series of smoothed shocks.
Figure (2.7) shows the time series representation of the evolution of the quar-
terly change of financial credit spreads in the data. We decompose each quarterly
realization (the black line) into the positive (above the x axis) and negative (below
the a axis) contributions of the fundamental shocks in the model. The shock series
are listed on the right side of the graph. The decomposition suggests that the ag-
gregate risk shock played a significant role in shaping the fluctuations in financial
funding spreads, including the spike during the 2008-2009 financial crisis. Figure
(2.8) shows the historical decomposition for corporate credit spreads. In this case,
both the idiosyncratic risk shock and the productivity shock play relatively larger
roles.
We define the bank capital gap as the percentage difference between bank






Figure (2.9) shows the evolution of the bank capital gap. The gap remains positive
during the 2008-2009 financial crisis, and is negative before the crisis. A positive gap
means that bank capital in the estimated economy is lower than the optimal level.
If banks were to issue equity freely as in the optimal economy, they would increase
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Notes: Quarterly de-trended financial funding spreads in the data (black line).
Sample period: 1991Q1 - 2016Q4
Figure 2.7: Historical Decomposition of De-trended Financial Funding Spreads
their capital level. We also show that the aggregate risk shock and the productivity
shock are the main drivers of bank capital gaps.
2.6 Conclusion
We develop a quantitative dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to
identify bank capital gaps (deviations of the observed level from the optimum) and
to shed light on macro-prudential policies regarding capital requirement. We propose
a tractable model to include firms’ and banks’ joint choice of capital structure, and
85
Notes: Quarterly de-trended corporate credit spreads in the data (black line).
Sample period: 1991Q1 - 2016Q4
Figure 2.8: Historical Decomposition of De-trended Corporate Credit Spreads
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Notes: The figure shows
Figure 2.9: Historical Decomposition of Bank Capital Gap
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their endogenous default caused by idiosyncratic and aggregate risk. The model
is estimated using Bayesian methods with quarterly data on balance sheets and
income statements of U.S. financial institutions from 1991 to 2016. We decompose
the historical fluctuations in bank capital gaps into contributions from a series of
financial shocks, in addition to the standard macroeconomic shocks. We find that
the aggregate risk shock plays an important role in explaining the spike in capital
gaps during the 2007-09 financial crisis. Capital gaps lead to (i) excessive increases in
banks’ default risk and cost of funding, (ii) gaps in lending, investment, employment
and output.
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Appendix A: Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 Figures of Motivating Facts
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Figure A.1: Measures of credit accessibility for small businesses
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Figure A.2: Interest rates on Commercial and Industrial loans and Treasury Bill
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Figure A.3: Bank loan rejection rates for U.K. 2001-2012
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A.2 Financial Contracts in the Full Model
In this section, I derive optimality conditions characterizing the financial con-





























SB(xt+1, z, σ)dH(σ|σ < σt)dG(z)Rkt+1QtK
f
t+1 ≥ RtDt





















And bank default threshold also depends on xt+1, which is characterized by equation
(with Lagrangian multiplier νt+1)
∫ σ̄t
a



























+ γt+1(1− µB)SBx (xt+1, z∗t+1) = 0
λt+1µBSBz (x, z∗) = νt+1
∫ σ̄t
a












t , Rt, R
k
t , Ct, Lt, Kt, It, Yt}, that are jointly determined by 21 equations
listed below.
• Three participation constraints of banks, mutual fund and bank shareholders
EShareBg(z
∗




t−1 − (1−G(z∗t ))Rdt+1Dt−1 = Rt−1NBt−1 (A.1)




(1−G(z∗t ))(RFt+1Bt−1 −Rdt+1Dt−1) = Rt−1NBt−1 (A.3)


























SB(xt+1, z∗t+1, σ)dH(σ|σ < σt)g(z∗t+1) = νt+1
∫ σ̄t
a
SBz (xt+1, z∗t+1;σ)dH(σ|σ < σt)
(A.6)
• Three threshold variables z∗t , x∗t , σt
∫ σ̄t−1
a







































• Balance sheet identities



















• Household utility maximization
UC(Ct, Lt) = βEt(UC(Ct+1, Lt+1)Rt) (A.16)
UL(Ct, Lt)
UC(Ct, Lt)
= (1− α)Yt/Lt (A.17)





Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It (A.19)
Rkt =




• Resource constraints and Market clearing





























































SBx (xt+1, z∗t+1;σj,t)dH(σj,t|σj,t < σt)
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SB(xt+1, z, σ)dH(σ|σ < σt)dG(z)



































In this section, I list the definition of variables that are used for calibration.
• Loan approval rate: ∫ σ̄
a
dH(σ) (A.22)
• Bank funding credit spread
RF −R (A.23)
• Firm borrowing credit spread
Rb −R (A.24)




























;σj)dH(σj|σj < σ̄) (A.26)
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• Banks’ probability of default (PD)
G(z∗) (A.27)









Appendix A: Appendix for Chapter 2
A.1 Equilibrium Conditions for Optimal Economy
















+ νEMt+1SB(x, z∗)Rk = 0
(A.1)













t+1))(1− τ) + γ(1− µB)SB(x, z∗) + νSB(x, z∗) (A.3)
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FOC xt+1











∗)(1− τ) + γ(1− µB)SBz (x, z∗) + νSBz (x, z∗)]RkQK
+[λg(z∗)(1− τ)− γg(z∗)]RdD] = 0
(A.5)
FOC Rdt+1
EtMt+1[(−λ(1− τ) + γ)(1−G(z∗))− ν] = 0 (A.6)
FOC Bt




A.2 Equilibrium Conditions in the Calibrated Economy















(SB(x, z∗) + (1− µB)SB(x, z∗))Rk −R
]
+ ν[SB(x, z∗)Rk −Rd] = 0
(A.9)
FOC xt+1
SEx (x) + λ
[
SBx (x, z∗) + (1− µB)SBx (x, z∗)
]





−g(z∗t+1)Rdt+1Dt + (1− µB)SB(x, z∗)g(z∗)RkQK
]
−λt+1µBSB(x, z∗)g(z∗)RkQK + νSBz (x, z∗)RkQK = 0
(A.11)
FOC Rdt+1
ν = γ(1−G(z∗)) (A.12)
A.2.1 Equilibrium Conditions
There are 15 key endogenous variables:
xt, z
∗






t , Ct, Lt, Kt, It, Yt, Rt, R
k
t , Dt
The first eight equations jointly determine the set of eight financial contractual
variables {xt, z∗t , λt, νt, Rdt+1, Dt}. The standard RBC model is given by equation
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(A.21) - (A.26), plus the standard investment Euler equation Et(Mt+1R
k
t+1) = 1,
which jointly determine the path of 7 endogenous variables {Ct, Lt, Kt, It, Yt, Rkt , Rt}.





Rkt+1QtKt+1 − (1−G(z∗t+1))Rdt+1Dt = RtNBt
(A.13)
(1−G(z∗t+1))Rdt+1Dt + (1− µB)
∫ z∗t+1
0
SB(xt+1, z)dG(z)Rkt+1QtKt+1 ≥ RtDt
(A.14)
• Bank default threshold z∗t+1
SB(xt+1, z∗t+1)Rkt+1QtKt+1 = Rdt+1Dt (A.15)

















λt+1µBSB(xt+1, z∗t+1)g(z∗t+1) = νt+1SBz (xt+1, z∗t+1) (A.18)
105






B + Tt (A.20)
• Household inter-temporal and intra-temporal optimality conditions













It = Kt − (1− δ)Kt−1 (A.24)
Rkt = αYt/Kt−1 + 1− δ (A.25)
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• Resource constraint
Ct + It = Yt (A.26)
• Balance sheet accounting identity
Dt = Kt −NEt −NBt (A.27)
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Jiménez, G., Moral-Benito, E., and Vegas, R. (2018). Bank Lending Standards Over
the Cycle: The Role of Firms’ Productivity and Credit Risk. SSRN Scholarly
Paper ID 3163419, Social Science Research Network, Rochester, NY.
Kiyotaki, N. and Moore, J. (1997). Credit Cycles. Journal of Political Economy,
105(2):211–248.
Laufer, S. and Paciorek, A. (2016). The effects of mortgage credit availability:
Evidence from minimum credit score lending rules.
Montoriol-Garriga, J. and Wang, J. C. (2011). The great recession and bank lending
to small businesses. Technical report, Working paper series//Federal Reserve
Bank of Boston.
Nuño, G. and Thomas, C. (2017). Bank leverage cycles. American Economic Jour-
nal: Macroeconomics, 9(2):32–72.
Ravn, S. H. (2016). Endogenous credit standards and aggregate fluctuations. Journal
of Economic Dynamics and Control, 69:89–111.
Rodano, G., Serrano-Velarde, N., and Tarantino, E. (2018). Lending Standards over
the Credit Cycle. The Review of Financial Studies, 31(8):2943–2982.
Ruckes, M. (2004). Bank competition and credit standards. Review of Financial
Studies, 17(4):1073–1102.
Shibut, L. and Singer, R. (2015). Loss Given Default for Commercial Loans at Failed
Banks.
Smets, F. and Wouters, R. (2007). Shocks and frictions in US business cycles: A
Bayesian DSGE approach. American economic review, 97(3):586–606.
Stiglitz, J. E. and Weiss, A. (1981). Credit rationing in markets with imperfect
information. The American economic review, pages 393–410.
Williamson, S. D. (1987). Costly monitoring, loan contracts, and equilibrium credit
rationing. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102(1):135–145.
110
